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The Marriage Tax: A Social and Fiscal Policy Reversal for U.S. Family Taxation
A.J. Cataldo II
Kevin Flynn
John S. DeJoy
Abstract
Cataldo and Flynn (2014) provided a historical review (1913-) of the marriage tax penalty (MTP)
and marriage tax bonus (MTB) that is created in the current income tax system that exists in the
United States. In addition, Cataldo and Flynn (2014) summarized significant comparative
studies for Canada, England and Wales through the 1990s, and described U.S. fiscal and tax
policy reforms (2001, 2003 and 2004) that minimized or eliminated the U.S. MTP. The
American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012 reverses U.S. tax policy, resurrecting concerns
about the MTP for higher income taxpayers.
We extend our previous work by comparing the U.S. marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratio to the
Canadian M-T-D ratio. The family remains the unit of taxation in the U.S. tax code, thus
creating the potential for the marriage tax. However, the individual remains the unit of taxation
in Canada, thus preventing the existence of the marriage tax. This is a timely and interesting
analysis because by comparing the M-T-D ratio in the U.S. where the marriage tax exists, to the
M-T-D ratio in Canada where the marriage tax does not exist, we can determine whether the
marriage tax has a significant effect on a couple’s decision to either marry, or stay married.
Those researching family taxation and policy issues, both within and outside of North America,
may find it helpful to exploit this alternative dimension for comparison and international
analysis.
Key words: marriage tax, marriage, divorce
Introduction
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 20121 has resurrected concerns about the marriage tax
penalty (MTP). Previously, Economic Growth and Tax Relief (EGTRRA 2001), Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation (JGTRRA 2003), and Working Families Tax Relief Acts
(WFTRA 2004) completely eliminated “base” effects-based MTPs (2003-) and reduced “rate”
effects-based MTPs. The latter was achieved through an expansion of the 15 percent bracket
(2004).
The U.S. MTP was operationally defined and associated with the establishment of separate tax
rate tables (“rate” effect), first established for single and married taxpayers for post-1970 tax
years. A difference in the personal exemption and standard deduction amount (“base” effect)
available to single and married taxpayers also resulted in MTPs and marriage tax bonuses
(MTBs), but this component of marriage tax penalties, bonuses and non-neutrality was
completely eliminated for post-2002 tax years. 2
Brozovsky and Cataldo (1994) examined combined “rate” and “base” effects and calculated
MTP and MTB ranges in their analysis of the entire history of individual Federal income
taxation in the U.S. Cataldo and Flynn (2014) used the 2001 Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
1

Pub.L. 112–240, H.R. 8, 126 Stat. 2313, enacted January 2, 2013, was passed by the United States Congress on
January 1, 2013, and was signed into law by President Barack Obama the next day.
2
This component of the MTP arose from differing personal exemptions (1913 through 1943) and standard
deductions (1944 through 2002). During this period, standard deductions amounts were purely variable (1944
through 1963), semi-variable or mixed (1964 through 1976), and purely fixed (1977 through 2002). The Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) increased the basic standard deduction amount for
married taxpayers to double the amount available to single taxpayers for the 2003 and 2004 tax years. It was
extended by the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (WFTRA) from 2005 through 2008 tax years.
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Statistics of Income (SOI) public use file to assist them in extending this methodology and these
measures through 2013. With a single exception, academic research results suggests that tax
penalties associated with the decision to marry, remain married, or divorce have affected the
timing, but not the incidence of marriage in the U.S., Canada, and England/Wales.
We extend Cataldo and Flynn (2014) from a U.S. tax-based focus to a U.S.-Canadian (North
American) marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratio-based focus. The U.S. system of individual
taxation taxes the household. The Canadian system of taxation taxes the individual. Therefore,
to the extent that M-T-D ratios between the U.S. and Canada are comparable, the decision or
marry, remain married, or divorce evolves from some non-tax or fiscal policy related variable.
While we expand our investigations to North America, where the American unit of taxation was
(and remains) the household and the Canadian unit of taxation was (and remains) the individual,
we do not extend our investigations to other countries. As of 1989 (an approximate mid-point
for the period examined), the Canadian unit of taxation feature is one shared with Australia,
Denmark, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden and the U.K. The American unit of taxation feature
was shared with France and Germany. However, France and Germany used single tax rates
schedules. The U.S. system is the only one of the above that both (1) defined the unit of taxation
as the household and (2) used separate or multiple tax rate schedules for the single and married
(filing jointly) filing statuses. The result is the U.S. tax tables or tax rate effect-based marriage
tax.
We extend and examine M-T-Ds developed by Cataldo and Savage (2001). Canada does not
have a marriage tax, per se, but enjoys an M-T-D ratio only slightly greater than that for the U.S.
for the post-1986 period. The comparability between U.S. and Canadian M-T-Ds and recent
research results suggest that cohabitation and changing social trends may represent more
significant factors than the marriage tax in future studies of the decision to marry, remain
married, separate, and divorce in North America.
The remainder of this paper is organized, as follows: Before introducing M-T-D ratios,
comparisons, and analysis, we provide a very brief summary of prior research, where, like
Cataldo and Flynn (2014), we used Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI)
data (1989 and 2001) to focus on the most significant MTPs. We provide a brief review of the
literature on the incidence and timing of the decision to marry, and develop comparative U.S. and
Canadian M-T-D ratio measures, where we examine the impact of U.S. tax legislation designed
to mitigate MTPs, including and controlling for U.S. MTPs. Our statistical results suggest that
U.S. and Canadian fiscal and tax policy may have played a less significant role in the decision to
marry, remain single, or divorce in North America. Instead, the increased correlation between
U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratios may be a function of the changing definition of the family and
social trends. Finally, we summarize our results, recommending the extension of our
methodology to countries outside of North America.
I.
Prior Research, Using IRS SOI Data and Focused on Significant MTPs
Table I provides a broad summary of the five most prevalent and/or significant U.S. MTPs,
provided in the same sequence and framework used in a U.S. Form 1040 – the income tax form
used by individual U.S. taxpayers. They were described and illustrated by Cataldo and Flynn
(2014). They are bolded and italicized in Table 1, and include: (1) the net capital loss (NCL)
ceiling or limitation of $3,000 per tax return, where two single taxpayers might generate a tax
deduction of up to $6,000; (2) Social Security benefits, where married taxpayers receive lower
amounts of old age, survivors and disability income (OASDI) and are taxed more heavily, when
974
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compared to two, single taxpayers, preferring to simply live together, outside of marriage; (3)
standard deductions available to married taxpayers, which is less than two times the amount
available to two single taxpayers (the “base” effect); (4) differing tax rates and tax rates tables,
penalizing married taxpayers (the “rate” effect); and (5) the imposition of the alternative
minimum tax (AMT), which also negatively impacts married taxpayers. This table should assist
others in conducting international comparisons. U.S. tax law specifically targeted U.S. MTPs for
reduction and/or elimination in legislation from 2001, 2003 and 2004, as noted in Table 1.
Refer Table I
Table II provides descriptive measures of the percentage of U.S. taxpayers impacted by the same
five most prevalent MTPs described by Cataldo and Flynn (2014) and addressed above, by
adjusted gross income (AGI) class, and using the same 1989 and 2001 IRS SOI data. Peak
measures are bolded, italicized and highlighted for emphasis. Note that the base (68%) and rate
(85%) effect-based MTPs impacted the largest percentage of U.S. taxpayers, but for taxpayers in
different AGI classes. The broad impact of the base and rate effect-based MTPs illustrates the
legislative motivation to reduce the impact of these MTPs. As noted in Table I, this legislation
mitigated these broad-based MTPs during 2001, 2003, 2004 and later tax years.
Refer Table II
Table III summarizes additional, less consequential MTPs, by U.S. Internal Revenue Code
Section (IRC§), and not addressed by Cataldo and Flynn (2014) or in the present study. They are
classified by low-, middle-, and high-income taxpayer classes.
Refer Table III
Generally, marriage tax penalties and marriage tax bonuses have been computed by simulating
and estimating these measures through (1) the marriage of single taxpayers (SGL) or (2) the
divorce of married taxpayers, filing jointly (MFJ), as illustrated in equation [1], below:
[SGL x 2] – MFJ = Marriage Tax Penalty/(Bonus)
[1]
Cataldo and Flynn (2014) computed their MTPs and MTBs, by using historical measures of AGI
class, at first quartile, weighted average, and third quartile AGI levels. Figure 1 illustrates the
range of penalties and bonuses associated with marriage for an entire century (1914 through
2013).
Figure 1 provides reference points for the historical expansion of the U.S. MTP (1971-). It also
illustrates reference points for legislation providing for mitigation of the MTP, through what was
known as a two-earner deduction (1982 through 1986; also referenced in Table I). This “abovethe-line” deduction reduced both base and rate effect-based MTPs. Finally, Figure 1, provides
reference points for the post-2003 elimination of the base effect-based MTP (also referenced in
Table I).
Refer Figure 1
II.
Effects of MTPs on the Timing and Incidence of Marriage
As noted by Cataldo and Flynn (2014), several studies examined the effect of MTPs on the
timing and incidence of marriage. There was quite a bit of evidence that the MTP affected the
timing of marriage in the U.S. (Sjoquist and Walker 1995 and Alm and Whittington 1995), but
Gelardi (1996) produced evidence that MTPs also affected the timing of marriage outside of the
U.S. (Canada, England and Wales). Only Alm and Whittington (1995) produced evidence that
MTPs impacted the incidence of marriage. Gelardi (1996) examined actual marriage and divorce
rates (Canada; 1950 through 1991 and England and Wales; 1960 through 1991), which we, also,
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examine, but by way of a U.S.-Canadian comparison. The results from these MTP-specific
studies are consistent with non-MTP-related or general studies on taxation:
…evidence about the economic response to tax reform suggests a hierarchy of
responses...(s)tanding at the top of the hierarchy…is the timing (emphasis added)
of economic transactions…(Slemrod 1990, 8-9)
The above studies supported the existence of this hierarchy (Trezevant 1994, 79, referring to
Slemrod 1990, 8-9). The use of actual marriage and divorce rates by Alm and Whittington
(1995) and Gelardi (1996) motivated Cataldo and Savage (2001) to develop and examine actual
marriage and divorce rates in the form of a marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratio, which we extend
and examine through the remainder of this paper.
III.
Data and Methodology: The Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D) Ratio
In the United States, the unit of taxation is the family or household, through optional joint or
separate filing for married taxpayers. In Canada, the unit of taxation is the individual. Canada
does not have a marriage tax and their system of individual income taxation is marriage neutral.
We used the annual IRS SOI, Canada Year Book and its American counterpart, Statistical
Abstract of the United States to capture marriage, divorce and U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI)
measures used for longitudinal regression model development. Both U.S. and Canadian M-T-D
ratios are provided for 1971 through 2008 (N = 38).3 These measures are summarized in Table
IV. We computed marriage-to-divorce ratios, using equation [2], as follows:
Marriages ÷ Divorces = Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D) Ratio
[2]
Refer Table IV
We should note that there is a trend, in both Canada and the U.S., to stop producing annual
measures for marriage and divorce. In Canada, these measures will not be produced post-2008.
In the U.S., these measures are no longer being produced for a relatively large U.S. state (e.g.,
California, post-2001). This data is costly to produce and the changing definition of the family
and increased incidence of same sex marriages, in North America, have, apparently, led policy
makers to place less emphasis on the importance of, and production of, these traditional
measures or operational definition of “family.”
Table IV contains M-T-D ratios for both the U.S. and Canada for the 1971 though 2008 calendar
years. Recall that 1971 is the first year when MTPs based on separate tax rates and tax rates
tables were established for single and married taxpayers (see Figure 1) and both rate and base
effect-based MTPs were mitigated by using a two-earner deduction for the 1982 through 1986
tax and calendar years (see Table I and Figure 1). Therefore, we produce four partitions for the
1971 through 2008 period under review, as follows: (1) 1971 through 1981 - the period where
MTPs are imposed by way of separate tax rates tables for single and married taxpayers; (2) 1982
through 1986 – the period where both rate and base effect-based MTPs were mitigated with the
two-earner deduction (also known as the U.S. Schedule W and highlighted in the table); (3) 1987
through 2002 – the period after the failure to extend the two-earner deduction, post-1986; and (4)
2003 through 2008 – the remainder of the period of marriage and divorce data availability for the
U.S. and Canada, after the elimination of the base effect-based MTP (highlighted in the table).

3

A comparable graphic, but only for 1971 through 1997, is provided in Cataldo and Savage (2001, 79).
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IV.
Pearson Product Moment Correlations – U.S. and Canadian M-T-D Ratios
We use Table V to present the results of Pearson product moment correlations between U.S. and
Canadian M-T-Ds for the entire period under review (N=38 for 1971 through 2008) and for all
four partitions developed and illustrated in Table IV. We have retained the highlighting feature,
to link Table IV to Table V data and facilitate comparison.
Refer Table V
Results for the four partitions follow: (1) 1971 through 1981 - the period where MTPs are
imposed by way of separate tax rate tables for single and married taxpayers (n=11; r=0.982 and
significant at the 0.0001 level); (2) 1982 through 1986 – the period where both rate and base
effect-based MTPs were targeted for mitigation with the two-earner deduction (also known as
the U.S. Schedule W and highlighted in the table; n=5; r=0.785 and not significant at any
reasonable level); (3) 1987 through 2002 – the period after the failure to extend legislation for
the two-earner deduction, post-1986 (n=16; r=0.498 and significant at the 0.05 level); and (4)
2003 through 2008 – the remainder of the period of marriage and divorce data availability for the
U.S. and Canada, after the elimination of the base effect-based MTP (highlighted in the table;
n=6; r=0.279 and not significant at any reasonable level).
The highest correlation between U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratios is highest during the 1971
through 1981 and 1987 through 2002 periods or partitions (see Tables IV and V). Those two
partitions or periods, presumed, based on U.S. tax legislation, to have targeted and eliminated
U.S. MTPs may, in fact, have had some impact, as the 1982 through 1986 and 1987 through
2002 period U.S.-Canadian M-T-Ds or partitions are not correlated. Alternatively, when viewing
the entire period (1971 through 2008), U.S.-Canadian M-T-D ratios are highly correlated
(r=0.736) and quite significant (p<0.0001). We also examine the data contained in Table IV in
regression equation form.
Equations [3a] and [3b] are designed to examine the dependence of U.S. M-T-D ratios on
Canadian M-T-D ratios, first, by controlling for “base” effects and the U.S. Schedule W or “two
earner” deduction, and second, by ignoring these American fiscal policy efforts to mitigate MTP,
as follows:
M-T-DU.S.
= β0 + β1MARCAN + β2BaseMTPU.S. + β3SchWU.S. + ε
[3a]
(+)
(-)
(-)
M-T-DU.S.
= β0 + β1MARCAN + ε
[3b]
(+)
Our prediction is that U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratios are positively correlated in both equations
[3a] and [3b]. In the case of equation [3a], we predict that the post-2002 elimination of the
“base” effect-based U.S. MTP (BaseMTPU.S.) and the “two earner” deduction or U.S. Schedule
W, present for 1982 through 1986) (SchWU.S.), are inversely correlated (see Tables IV and V and
Figure 1). Regression results are summarized in Table VI, where all results are consistent with
those predicted.
Refer Table VI
Table VI results suggest that 52.9 percent of the U.S. M-T-D ratio is explained by the Canadian
M-T-D ratio. Inclusion of the BaseMTP and SchW independent variables, both designed to
reduce the marriage tax, produce an additional 14 percent of explanatory power to the regression
model (see Tables IV and V and Figure 1).
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Elimination of the base MTP, as a fiscal policy measure designed to mitigate the marriage tax,
was statistically significant. The 1982 through 1986 establishment of a deduction for “two
earners” did not produce a statistically significant impact on the U.S. M-T-D ratio. A simple
graphic provides additional insights into the U.S.-Canadian trend or pattern in marriage and
divorce.
Figure 2 provides for a graphic of U.S.-Canadian M-T-D ratios for 1971 through 2008. Note that
the decline in the U.S. M-T-D ratio stabilized, and has remained reasonably stable at a ratio
approximating 2-to-1, after full implementation of this first tax “rate”-based MTP (1971 through
1976). The Canadian M-T-D ratio first declines to/below already stabilized levels for the U.S.
for 1987 and future years.4 The fact that Canada does not have a MTP, per se, may explain why
public policy researchers interested in family taxation issues and attempting to quantify the
impact of fiscal policy-based MTPs, in the past, have found it difficult to quantify the impact of
tax law on the incidence of marriage.
V.
Social Trends
The comparability between U.S. and Canadian marriage-to-divorces and recent research results
suggest that cohabitation and changing social trends may represent more significant factors than
marriage tax penalties in future studies of the decision to marry, remain married, or divorce. For
example, the contemporary earned income tax credit (EITC) was examined by Dickert-Conlin
and Houser (2002, p 25). They found that “those facing larger increases in their EITC were less
likely to remain married, found no relationship between the EITC and marriage for unmarried
women, and concluded that the EITC expansion during the early- to mid-1990s had little or no
effect on marriage decisions.”
The conclusions reached by Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002) provide additional support to a
(still) growing body of evidence. The contemporary U.S. experience of the past few decades,
characterized by declining marriage/increasing divorce rates, is not a function of the expansion
of the EITC or economics. It is a phenomenon related to changing social trends, including
cohabitation (Alm, Thacher and Whittington 1999; Dickert-Conlin, Houser and Li 2002).
Cataldo and Savage (2001, p 77) addressed these changing social trends. “The post-World War
II period enjoyed an increased female presence in the labor force, broad use of newly developed
birth control measures, endorsed by the U.S. National Council of Churches (1961), rising
feminism and the establishment of the National Organization for Women (NOW, 1963), the
Equal Pay Act (1963), the Civil Rights Act (1964), gay rights activism, and U.S. legalization of
abortion by the Supreme Court (1973).” In recent years, legislation and issues related to same
sex marriages have been addressed in the popular press.
The…marriage penalty gained notoriety…when the news media published
stories…married couples…were divorcing near the end of the year so they could
file tax returns as unmarried individuals…then remarry early in the following year
(Strefeler 1982, 5).
After more than three decades and several published studies attempting to causally link the U.S.
marriage tax penalty with declining marriage and increasing divorce rates, only one study found
evidence connecting the marriage tax penalty with the incidence of marriage and divorce (Alm
and Whittington 1995). However, that study plus a study examining a comparable time period
4

Though likely to be coincidental, this post-1986 period of greater U.S. and Canadian M-T-D ratio comparability
coincides with the 1985-1986 Canadian tax law change designed to eliminate the tax benefits associated with fiscal
year-end marriages (Gelardi 1996).
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(Sjoquist and Walker 1995) found that taxes affected both the timing of the decision to marry and
divorce in the U.S., and the timing of the decision to marry and divorce in Canada and
England/Wales (Gelardi 1996).
VI.
Summary
We provide an extension to Cataldo and Flynn (2014), providing a framework for the most
prevalent marriage tax penalties under U.S. tax law and summarizing fiscal policy changes
designed to reduce these MTPs (Table I). Table II contained additional, descriptive measures,
using the same data base used by Cataldo and Flynn, for ease of comparison and continuity. We
noted less significant MTPs in Table III. The range for American MTPs and MTBs for an entire
century (1914 through 2013), for first and third quartile and weighted-average U.S. adjusted
gross income levels, and referencing two pieces of legislation specifically designed to mitigate or
reduce tax penalties associated with the decision to marry or remain married has been provided.
Tables IV, V and VI provided the raw data and statistical results and comparisons between U.S.
and Canadian marriage-to-divorce (M-T-D) ratios. We find that U.S. fiscal policy changes
and/or tax legislation designed to mitigate or reduce MTPs produce less explanatory power,
when compared to Canadian M-T-D ratios. Since Canada taxes the individual and not the
family, and does not have, and never has had, a penalty associated with the decision to marry or
remain married, we anticipate little or no impact from the resurrection of the new U.S. marriage
tax.
The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012 reverses U.S. tax policy, resurrecting
concerns about the MTP for higher income taxpayers. North American changes in social trends
suggest that the decision to marry, remain married, divorce or select cohabitation as an
alternative to marriage will continue to contribute complexity to the study of family taxation
issues. The post-1986 comparability between U.S. and Canadian marriage-to-divorce ratios,
where no marriage tax, per se, exists under the Canadian system of individual taxation, supports
the changing social trend explanation for these decisions, as the composition and operational
definitions of both U.S. and Canadian households and family continues to change. An extension
of our methodology and the examination of this issue for other countries will provide insights
into both North American and non-North American decisions to marry or remain married.
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Table I: The Calculation of Taxable Income and Tax in the U.S. Selected Marriage Tax Penalty
(MTP) Components
MTP Description
Gross Income includes
NCL Net Capital Loss ceiling/annual limitation per household
SS
Social Security
Less:
Adjustments to Income5
Equals:
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
Less:
Personal Exemptions
Less:
BASE Standard Deduction6
Equals:
Taxable Income

Equals:

RATE Tax Rates Tables
AMT Alternative Minimum Tax
Tax7
Marriage Tax Penalty (MTP) components, specifically
targeted for reduction and/or elimination by the
• Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001
(EGTRRA),
• Jobs Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
(JGTRRA), and
• Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004
(WFTRA).

5

The two-earner deduction (Schedule W) was available as an adjustment to income for the 1982 through 1986 tax
years.
6
Taxpayers with itemized deductions in excess of the standard deduction (i.e., excess itemized deductions), an
amount based on the taxpayer’s household status, is permitted to deduct the larger of their standard or itemized
deductions.
7
The taxpayer pays the larger of tax based on tax rates tables or their alternative minimum tax.
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Table II: Percentage of Taxpayers Affected by Marriage Tax Penalty Type and Adjusted Gross
Income (AGI) Class (2001 & 1989)
AGI Class
$1K-$10K
$11K-$20K
$21K-$30K
$31K-$40K
$41K-$50K
$51K-$75K
$76K$100K
$101K$200K
Overall

NCL
2001
20%
16%
14%
16%
15%
19%

1989
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
3%

SS
2001
0%
0%
14%
22%
20%
18%

1989
0%
0%
5%
10%
10%
3%

Base
2001
0%
32%
68%
63%
57%
41%

1989
0%
0%
0%
0%
49%
92%

Rate
2001
0%
0%
0%
0%
16%
53%

1989
93%
87%
76%
61%
42%
23%

AMT
2001
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
2%

1989
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

25%

6%

0%

0%

24%

98%

84%

11%

6%

2%

33%
23%

n.a.
3%

0%
8%

n.a.
5%

15%
34%

n.a.
37%

85%
47%

n.a.
53%

13%
5%

n.a.
0%
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Table III: Additional MTP Components by U.S. Internal Revenue Code Section (IRC§)1
IRC§

Provision

Phase-out Levels for Low-Income Taxpayers:
21
30% Dependent Care Credit
22
Elderly Credit
32
EIC (no child)
32
EIC (1 child)
32
EIC (2 or more children)
Phase-out Levels for Middle-Income Taxpayers:
219
IRA Deduction
221
Education Interest Expense
Phase-out Levels for High-Income Taxpayers:
24
Child Credit
25A
Hope & Lifetime Learning Credit
23&137
Adoption Credit & Exclusion
135
EE Bond Interest Exclusion
151
Personal Exemption
219(g)(7) IRA w/Spouse w/Retirement Plan
408A
Roth IRA Deduction
408A
IRA to Roth IRA Rollover
469(i)
$25K Rent Passive Loss
469(i)
Passive Rehabilitation Credit
530
Education IRA Deduction
Other:
67
121
143
151
213
469
1400C

1

2% Floor – Misc. Item. Deds.
Principal Residence Exclusion
Recapture of Subsidy – Mtg. Bonds
Casualty & Theft Loss
7.5% Floor on Medical Expenses
Passive Activity Rental Real Estate
Homebuyer Credit for D.C.

As adapted from Brazelton (2002).
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Table IV: U.S. & Canadian Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D), Standard Deduction or Base Marriage
Tax Penalty (BaseMTP), and U.S. Schedule W (SchW) Measures 1971 through 2008 (N=38)
YEAR
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

M-TDU.S.
2.8331
2.7006
2.4962
2.2825
2.0782
1.9898
1.9963
2.0195
1.9738
2.0101
1.9967
2.0991
2.1123
2.1189
2.0277
2.0433
2.0609
2.0531
2.0769
2.0668
1.9975
1.9440
1.9663
1.9832
1.9983
2.0383
2.0499
2.2174
2.1963
2.2123
2.0618
2.2432
2.2457
2.2717
2.2197
2.1369
2.1390
2.0536

M-TDCAN
6.3667
6.2500
5.3784
4.4222
3.8824
3.5741
3.4000
3.2632
3.1864
3.0806
2.7941
2.6857
2.6812
2.8615
2.9677
2.2564
1.8958
2.2381
2.3580
2.4103
2.2338
2.0886
2.0385
2.0253
2.0513
2.1806
2.3731
2.6540
2.5074
2.2123
2.0621
2.0916
2.0810
2.0999
2.0753
2.0153
2.0358
2.0973

BaseMTP
$1,050
$925
$1,057
$1,117
$980
$926
$802
$745
$672
$591
$534
$504
$488
$468
$467
$478
$471
$343
$327
$326
$328
$347
$337
$342
$333
$336
$354
$349
$341
$342
$344
$340
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

SchW
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Table V: Pearson Product Moment Correlation Measures between U.S. & Canadian Marriage-toDivorce (M-T-D) Ratios for the Entire Population & Four Partitions 1971 through 2008 (N=38)
(developed from data contained in Table IV)
Number of Observations

N=38

=

n=11

Years in Partition

[19712008]

[19711981]

n=5
Schedule
W
[19821986]

M-T-DU.S. x M-T-DCAN
Pearson
Product
Moment
Correlation
P-Value

0.736*
0.000

0.982*
0.000

0.169
0.785

Reason for Partition

n=16

n=6
No
MTP

Base

[19872002]

[2003-2008]

0.498*
0.050

0.279
0.592

Table VI: Results for Regression Equations [3a] and [3b] Coefficients, Signs, and Summarized
Results 1971 through 2008 (N=38)
Description

Equation
[3a]

Equation
[3a]

Summarized Results

Intercept

1.6755

1.7794

Sign and coefficient not predicted.

M-T-DCAN

0.2508

0.1253

BaseMTP

-0.0005

Positive sign, as predicted, and significant at the
0.01% level.
Negative sign, as predicted, and significant at the
0.01% level.

SchW

-0.1403

Negative sign, as predicted, but not significant.

Adjusted R-Square
Overall F-Statistic

76.9%
41.99

Variables:

52.9%
42.49

Approximately 14% of M-T-DU.S. is not predicted by
M-T-DCAN.
Significant at the 0.01% level.

985

International Research Journal of Applied Finance
Vol. V Issue – 8 August, 2014

ISSN 2229 – 6891
Impact Factor 2.501

Figure 1: Range of the Combined Base- and Rate-Based Marriage Tax Bonus/(Penalty) in
Nominal Dollars for 1st Quartile-, Weighted-Average- and 3rd Quartile-Based AGIs for 100
Years - 1914 through 2013
1st Quartile
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$2,000

Tax rates schedulebased marriage tax
penalty begins (1971-).

Two-earner
deduction
(1982-1986).
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eliminate
d (2003-).

$1,000
$0
($1,000)
($2,000)

Weighted-Average
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
($1,000)
($2,000)

3rd Quartile
$5,000
$4,000
$3,000
$2,000
$1,000
$0
($1,000)
($2,000)
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Figure 2: Comparison: U.S. (US) & Canadian (CAN) Marriage-to-Divorce (M-T-D) Ratios 1971
through 2008 (N=38) (developed from data contained in Table IV)
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